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A survey of national animal influenza surveillance programmes was conducted to assess the current capacity to detect influenza viruses with zoonotic potential in animals (i.e. those influenza viruses that can be naturally transmitted between animals and humans) at regional and global levels. Information on 587 animal influenza surveillance system components was collected for 99 countries from Chief Veterinary Officers (CVOs) (n = 94) and published literature. A surveillance system component is hereby characterized by (a) surveillance type (active, passive, etc.), (b) purpose (national or international surveillance system, research, etc.), (c) objective (detection, monitoring, etc.), (d) influenza targeted (avian, equine, swine, pandemic influenza), and (e) target population (domestic, wild, companion animals).
Less than 1% (n = 4) of these components were specifically aimed at detecting influenza viruses with pandemic potential in animals (i.e. those influenza viruses that are capable of causing epidemic spread in human populations over large geographical regions or worldwide), which would have zoonotic potential as a prerequisite. Those countries that sought to detect influenza viruses with pandemic potential searched for such viruses exclusively in domestic pigs.
This work shows the global need for increasing surveillance that targets potentially zoonotic influenza viruses in relevant animal species.
Main recommendations from the study can be summarized as follows:
- Animal influenza surveillance systems have high potential to informhuman pandemic risk if several integrated components of representative or risk-based surveillance are in place. Those countries only implementing few components are encouraged to diversify surveillance efforts in order to target more influenza viruses and/or animal populations.
- To improve pandemic preparedness, subtypes with higher zoonotic risk should be targeted regardless of their importance for animal production, health or trade.
- Routine testing of poultry or pigs for purposes other than pandemic preparedness can and should be used to screen also for potentially pandemic viruses. As part of the routine laboratory investigation of viruses suspected to have zoonotic potential, screening for human-adaptive traits should be performed.
- Laboratory methods such as PCR or virus isolation constitute the case definition of choice. Countries are further encouraged to regularly select a subset of viruses for genetic characterization through sequencing.
- Timely reporting of surveillance results, including surveillance activities by the private sector or in the framework of research, and international access to important or particular findings are as important as submitting animal influenza virus sequences to public genetic databases and sharing live virus with the international research community.
VON Dobschuetz S, DE Nardi M, Harris KA, Munoz O, Breed AC, Wieland B, Dauphin G, Lubroth J, Stärk KD; the FLURISK Consortium. Influenza surveillance in animals: what is our capacity to detect emerging influenza viruses with zoonotic potential? Epidemiol Infect. 2014 Sep 30:1-18.